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To understand attitudes about voting in Kenya, this study examines Kenyan
voters’ feelings of freedom to vote according to their own will and without pressure.
More specifically it seeks to determine the extent to which these feelings are affected by
1) perception of corruption, 2) levels of trust in the government, 3) fear of political
violence and intimidation, and 4) ethnic identity. Rational choice theory and an insideroutsider perspective are applied to examine the issue from a theoretical framework.
Previous research conducted in relation to voting behavior and perception of corruption,
trust in government, and ethnicity, among other things, are considered. This study uses
secondary data collected by the Afrobarometer in 2008, and bivaraite and multivariate
analysis are employed.
Logistic regression models are used to examine the extent to which certain
variables explain feelings of freedom to vote according to personal preference. The
results from the logistic regression analyses show that both trust in government and fear
of being subject to political violence and intimidation affect Kenyan voters’ feelings of
freedom to vote according to their personal preference. These results support two
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hypotheses. First, Kenyan voters will feel freer to vote according to their own preference
as their levels of trust in the government increase. Second, Kenyan voters’ feelings of
freedom to vote will be negatively associated with fear of being subject to political
violence and intimidation.

viii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The African Union Commission is seriously preoccupied with the recent
happenings in Kenya due to the presidential elections as well as the violence that
followed the announcement of the results. The Commission reiterates its
attachment to democratic principles as stipulated in the Constitutive Act of the
African Union and in the African Charter for Democracy, Elections and
Governance, particularly when it comes to free, fair, and transparent elections, in
conformity to the Declaration of the Union on the principles governing
democratic elections in Africa. (Addis Ababa December 31, 2007)
The term “democracy” can be traced back to the ancient Greek word
“demokratia,” which meant people-power, and it has developed over the centuries to have
a wide range of definitions and variations. At the core of the principles of democracy
there is wide consensus that a democracy refers to “government of the people by the
people for the people,” as Abraham Lincoln envisioned it (Cartledge 2009
[www.bbc.co.uk]). As history evolves, there has been a widespread trend towards global
democratization, but some countries have been slower in this process than others. While
countries such as the United States and France can trace their transformation toward
democracy centuries back hundreds of years, most countries in Africa can go only as far
as a few decades in tracing their attempt at becoming democratic countries. This study
looks at one such country in Africa, Kenya, whose recent push towards becoming a
democracy has proven to be a challenging task, as she experienced a wave of violence
after the 2007 national elections.

1
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At the heart of a Democracy lies a country’s electoral system and its ability to
conduct free and fair elections. In referring to what a democratic electoral system should
look like, the United Nation’s articles state that:
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
procedures. (United Nations 2010 [www.un.org; Article 21])
Since its independence, Kenya has envisioned having free and fair elections such as those
described by the UN articles, but like many countries in the same situation, corruption
has found its way deep into the roots of the government, and it has made it nearly
impossible for Kenya to attain free and fair democratic elections thus far. The United
Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC) deals in large part with corruption, but fails
to give it a clear and specific definition. Instead corruption is described as a phenomenon
that “undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development and contributes to
governmental instability (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 2010.
[www.unodc.org; para. 1])” The UNODC instead defines corruption through describing
it:
Corruption attacks the foundation of democratic institutions by distorting electoral
processes, perverting the rule of law and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose
only reason for existing is the soliciting of bribes. (United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime 2010[www.unodc.org; para.1])
The purpose of this study is to measure the extent to which citizens of Kenya feel
free to vote according to their own will, without reservations and without fear of political
intimidation and violence. Furthermore, this study seeks to find the extent to which these
feelings of freedom to vote according to one’s own preference are affected by levels of
trust in the government, levels of perceived corruption in the government, and personal
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views on whether the past elections of 2007 were free and fair. Last but not least, this
study seeks to determine whether belonging to a dominant ethnic group in Kenya plays a
significant role in voters’ freedom to vote, and, if so, to what extent.
This study uses the data of the Afrobarometer survey conducted in Kenya in 2008.
The Afrobarometer is now on its fourth round, and much research has been conducted on
topics that closely relate to this study. However, the results gathered from this research
will be unique in that none of the studies previously done with these data have looked at
Kenya’s citizenry’s feelings of freedom to vote according to personal preference without
pressure. With this said, topics such as voting behavior and attitudes and issues such as
perceived corruption and political trust have been an area of extensive study for political
scientists and other professional scholars. In addition, much research relating to Kenya
and neighboring countries has focused on ethnicity and its defining role in different social
and political issues.
This study analyzes previous research conducted on these various issues in hopes
of shedding light on the main focus of this study. More specifically the studies included
in the review look at previous research conducted on voting behavior and the effects that
perceived corruption and political trust have on voters. A close look at what researchers
have found on ethnicity as it is related to voting in Kenya is also considered. The
literature review is followed by the theoretical frameworks considered and those by a
detailed description of the methodology that was employed. Next is an analysis of the
results and a concluding section devoted to reflection on the results of this study.
However, first consider a brief note on why this study is pertinent and in need of
investigation.
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After multiple failed attempts at true, fair, and democratic elections, the instability
and fragmentation of Kenya’s national government manifested itself in a case of violent
political riots shortly after the 2007 elections. Results from previous studies of the
Afrobarometer Survey suggest that citizens of Kenya felt that little progress was made in
tackling corruption after the 2002 elections (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 48 2006),
and most of them thought that either some problems or major problems would follow the
2007 elections (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 26 2008). If the people of Kenya were
able to accurately predict the violence that was to follow as the 2007 elections
progressed, how does this affect the way these people vote and how they feel about their
personal freedom to express their opinion through voting? Did the extent of their
perception of corruption in which the government is involved affect their voting
behavior? Does their level of trust in the government affect how they feel about their
freedom to vote? Moreover, are they fearful of being subject to political violence and
intimidation, and, if so, to what extent does this affect how they feel about the extent of
their freedom to voice their opinion through the process of voting? Last, how are all these
factors related to and affected by ethnic identity? Does being a member of a dominant
tribe in Kenya trump all other factors when it comes to voting? Or, do voters consider
their own opinion and put ethnic politics aside when it comes to voting? It is these
questions that have triggered my curiosity and encouraged me to pursue this research
project.
Voting freedom is fundamental for a country to carry out fair and free elections
and, thus, take a step closer to becoming a democratic state. This issue has various
theoretical implications. The section that follows discusses two theoretical perspectives to

5
make sense of the issue at hand and later the results of this particular study. First a
rational-choice-theoretical framework combined with a theory of residues is employed to
aid in better understanding voters’ behavior and attitudes. Advocates of this perspective
contend that human behavior is rational and based on careful analysis of costs and
benefits. While this theoretical approach is the central theory behind the premises of this
research, a necessity to analyze the role of ethnic identity last led me to consider a second
theory, the insider-outsider theory. This theory analyzes the issue at hand by placing
focus on the individual voters and their status in relation to individual accessibility to
information. The insider-outsider perspective also examines perception of corruption, but
it ties it to voters’ attitudes by analyzing the voter as the unit of analysis. The following
chapter goes into further inquiry of the three theoretical approaches mentioned thus far.

CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
The electoral history of Kenya can be described as a long struggle for power
overshadowed by an ethnically fragmented population and fueled by a long history of
ethnic conflict. The purpose of this study is to try to make sense of the voting behavior of
Kenyan citizens and to shed light on the dynamics that influence voters’ freedom to
express their opinions during presidential elections. More specifically, the goal of this
research is to focus on Kenya’s voting population and to analyze their views on the levels
of corruption in the government, their trust in the government, and their fear of being
subject to political violence or intimidation in order to address a broader issue, freedom
to vote according to one’s personal preference during national elections in Kenya. The
section that follows analyzes this issue through a theoretical framework in order to better
comprehend the implications of the research question. First, a rational choice theory will
be considered to examine certain factors affecting voting behavior. This will be followed
by a careful analysis of the insider-outsider perspective, which will aid in explaining the
role that ethnic identity plays in individuals’ overall decision-making process in voting.
A Rational Choice Approach and Pareto’s Theory of Residues
Vilfredo Pareto ([1916] 1935) analyzes human behavior through his theory of
residues and derivations. He argues that human action is not necessarily rational but that
people use theories and explanations in order to make actions seem logical. Moreover, he
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contends that there are underlying sentiments and feelings that directly affect human
behavior and, that in many cases, these come before the rational explanation. Pareto
([1916] 1935) argues that it is these sentiments that shape the explanations by which
people rationalize their actions. He calls these sentiments “residues,” and the
explanations by which humans rationalize action the “derivations” (Pareto). According to
Pareto, residues are found somewhere between human instinct and the belief systems that
help people rationalize action. These sentiments are not a reflection of human instincts
but a manifestation of them, and, thus, whether people are conscious about them or not,
residues affect human behavior (Pareto [1916] 1935).
I adopt this theoretical framework only to acknowledge that rationalization of
action can be rooted in deeper sentiments, whether conscious or unconscious. This is
done to recognize Pareto’s notion of residues and combine it with a rational-choice
approach, which together will serve as the theoretical framework by which the issue
under study will be analyzed. I deviate from Pareto’s theory because he argues that most
action is not rational and that instead theories and explanations serve only to make action
appear rational (Pareto). Instead I adopt a rational-choice theory approach because, while
I agree that there may be unconscious sentiments that affect action, Pareto does not
provide any evidence that action is not rational. As further explained in the following
section, rational-choice theory asserts that people analyze potential behavior through a
rational process, which people use to make final decisions to act one way or another.
By combining Pareto’s idea of residues with a rational-choice approach, it will be
illustrated that when a person engages in a rational analysis of costs and benefits, this
analysis is affected by deeper sentiments that must be taken into account. These deeper
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sentiments, or notion of residues, combined with the rational-choice theory approach can
be used to explain the effect that both trust in government and perceived corruption as
well as fear (of political violence) can have on a person’s feelings of freedom to vote
according to personal views and his or her overall voting behavior.
Rational Choice Theory
Rational choice theory, as defined by Peter Abell (2009:1):
invites us to understand individual actors (which in specified circumstances may
be collectivities of one sort or another) as acting, or more likely interacting, in a
manner such that they can be deemed to be doing the best they can for
themselves, given their objectives, resources, and circumstances, as they see
them.
In other words, the modern rational-choice theory explains human behavior in terms of
cost-benefit analysis. It contends that human beings are rational, and decisions and
actions are preceded by a cost-benefit analysis of possible outcomes and rewards.
George Homans (1958) introduces this notion in his exchange theory with his
“rationality proposition,” in which he argues that humans rate behaviors in terms of how
rewarding they will be; whether a person decides to perform an action will depend on his
or her perception of the probability that he or she will succeed. Thibaut and Kelley (1959)
extended Homan’s theory by introducing the comparison levels of alternatives. They
argued that human beings rate behavior on a scale from most rewarding to most costly,
and they are constantly comparing options and alternatives in terms of their perceived
rate of costs and rewards of each. They believe that all behavior is guided by this
comparison of alternatives and that humans are constantly looking for something better.
Political scientists have since found a way to apply this approach to voting behavior,
mainly by looking for patterns that explain why people vote and why they do not.
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Rational-Behavior Theory of Voting Participation
Feddersen (2004) uses rational choice theory to analyze the paradox of not voting.
He explains that there is widespread evidence suggesting that the probability that an
individual vote can actually change an election outcome is extremely small (Feddersen
2004; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). This means that, if people voted only for the purpose
of making a difference in an election outcome, very few would show up to vote.
However, many people do, in fact, show up and put up with a variety of inconveniences
to vote. Like many other scholars, Feddersen (2004) feels that this paradox can be
explained through a theory of rational choice. Durden and Gaynor (1987) follow this
theoretical framework in analyzing voting behavior. They suggest that voting is a rational
action, and that people will vote when the benefits will exceed the costs.
There are many factors that can be considered as costs and benefits to voters.
Multiple researchers agree that a sense of civic obligation or duty acts as a strong reward
or factor pushing people to vote. (Blais 2000; Durden and Gaynor 1987; Feddersen 2004;
Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Another possible factor that can act as a reward or
motivation to vote is the argument that those who feel that voting is their given right will
vote regardless of what the cost or outcome might be (Durden and Gaynor 1987). With
this said, people who feel morally obligated to take advantage of their voting rights still
have to make a choice in terms of how they vote, and different factors can persuade them
to vote one way or another. For example, there are groups of people that share political
views and beliefs, who can be mobilized in masses by leaders. From this, members of the
groups can be affected by peer pressure, so to speak, and they not only fulfill a civic duty
to vote but an obligation to vote a specific way. This type of mobilization is said to be

10
caused by the leaders themselves who place social pressure on the citizens. (Shachar and
Nalebuff 1999; Uhlander 1989). As portrayed thus far, the decision making-process
behind voting behavior is an extremely complex one. What follows is an application of
the theoretical implications made thus far to the research question under study.
Applied Theory: Residues and Rational-Choice Approach Combined
The focus of this study is to analyze the extent to which Kenyan voters feel free to
vote according to their own will. Furthermore, how is their freedom to express their own
opinion through voting affected by their perception of levels of corruption in the
government, their trust in the government, and their fear of being subjected to political
violence? To better understand this issue, it is imperative to analyze it through a
theoretical framework. Thus far, Pareto’s ([1916] 1935) theory of residues and a rational
choice theory have been examined independently. Now, through combining the two
perspectives I will analyze the question under consideration.
Following a rational-choice approach as applied to voting behavior would imply
that voters, when making a decision about their voting behavior, will first analyze the
costs and benefits previously explained. Some of the costs include finding a way to get to
the voting booth, being stigmatized for not complying with social pressure, and the
chance of becoming a victim of political violence. Some of the benefits include the
fulfillment of civic duty, taking advantage of a given right, and social acceptance.
Adding Pareto’s notion of residues would imply that there are certain sentiments,
feelings, or attitudes that precede this rational weighing of costs and benefits. That is
where perception of corruption, trust in government, and fear of political violence come
in. All three of these are personal feelings or attitudes that play roles in shaping the way
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an individual will go about analyzing costs and benefits. This is illustrated through the
following example.
A person is in a voting booth and is trying to decide for whom to vote. This voter
has three options, Candidate A, Candidate B, and Candidate C. This voter prefers
Candidate B, but Candidate A seems to be the more popular choice. In making the final
decision, whether to vote for Candidate A or B, this voter will analyze the possible costs
and possible benefits of voting for each candidate. This is where the so called “residues,”
or sentiments preceding this decision, become critical. If this person has low levels of
trust in government, perceives high levels of corruption, or is afraid of being subject to
political violence, he or she will be more likely to feel threatened by costs such as falling
victim to political crimes. He or she may feel that, given the circumstances, the costs
outweigh the gains. On the other hand, having positive attitudes about the government
and having little fear of becoming a victim of political violence will decrease the amount
of importance placed on such costs and, thus, will increase the chance that the voter will
feel free to vote for whom he or she prefers.
Insider-Outsider Perspective: Perceived Levels of Corruption and Voting Attitudes
In trying to understand voting behavior in Kenya, it is important to not only
understand voting patterns and theoretical implications but to really grasp the current
situation specific to the time and place under consideration. In Kenya’s case ethnic
divisions are so deeply imprinted in the culture that one could not properly analyze the
elections without paying close attention to how ethnic identity will affect individuals’
voting behavior. Thus far I have considered how perception of corruption, trust in
government, and fear of political violence affect the decision-making process involved in
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voting. However, in Kenya’s case all of this is subject to change when ethnic identity is
added to the equation. An insider-outsider perspective will be used to better understand
the effect that ethnicity has on voting behavior.
The insider-outsider perspective analyzes individuals with respect to the access
that they have to political figures. This theory is based on the idea that having access to
political figures gives individuals certain advantages over those who do not have access.
For this reason proponents of this theory argue that attitudes about the government, such
as perceived levels of corruption, vary depending on whether a citizen is considered an
insider or an outsider (Chang and Kerr 2009). Those who have preferential access to
political figures are considered to be insiders, and those who lack this access are the
outsiders. The main argument behind this theory is that insiders tend to feel that political
parties and institutions have lower levels of corruption, while outsiders feel the opposite
and tend to be less content with the overall institution. Chang and Kerr argue that insiders
will perceive lower levels of corruption because they are less likely to look for
information in relation to government corruption. Many insiders have a strong loyalty to
their political figure or party. Chang and Kerr argue that, if insiders come across such
information, they will disregard it on the grounds of lack of reliability. In other words,
they will choose not to believe it.
Using the insider-outsider perspective to analyze Kenya can have some important
implications. Because Kenya’s political world is so distinctively divided by ethnic
groups, having insider or outsider status will depend largely on the ethnic group or tribe
to which voters belong and the ethnic group that is currently in control, and, thus, so will
attitudes about the government. Following this train of thought, a voter’s ethnic identity
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will play an important role in determining the status as either insider or outsider. Thus, a
voter who belongs to the same ethnic group as the party currently in control will have
different opinions about the government from one who belongs to the opposing party’s
ethnic group. This is best illustrated by an example.
There are two voters, Voter 1 and Voter 2. Voter 1 belongs to ethnic tribe X ,and
Voter 2 belongs to ethnic tribe Y. Each voter has three options; Candidate A, Candidate
B, and Candidate C. The current president, who happens to be Candidate A, belongs to
ethnic tribe X. The week before the elections there is a media outbreak in which it is
speculated that the current president, Candidate A, is to blame for a violent attempt to
intimidate the opposition leader, Candidate B. Candidate B belongs to ethnic group Y, the
same as that of Voter 2. The question is whether there will be a difference in attitudes
between voters 1 and 2 and whether this difference affected by the voters’ ethnicity?
Framing this question under the insider- outsider perspective, the answer to both
parts of this question is yes. Because Voter 1 belongs to the same ethnic tribe as
Candidate A, he will have more access to this party or information about this party; and
due to these advantages and possibly his loyalty, he will be less likely to believe that
Candidate A was to blame for unlawful behavior. On the other hand, voter 2, who
belongs to the opposition tribal group that was violently threatened, has no inside
information as to the kind of activity in which candidate A’s party is engaged, and so he
or she believes the speculations about Candidate A. In turn, Voter 2 has less trust in the
current president, (also Candidate A), perceives higher levels of corruption in the
government, and is more afraid of political violence than Voter 1 is. As explained
through the insider-outsider perspective and portrayed through this example, ethnic
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identity plays a critical role in the political and social world of Kenya, and, thus, it is
crucial to this study.
Conclusion
The process of explaining voting behavior through a theoretical framework is a
complex task. It becomes even more challenging when targeting a country such as
Kenya, where specific factors such as ethnic identity play such an active role in voters’
lives. The purpose of this research is to understand what factors play a role in Kenyan
voters’ personal feelings about their freedom to vote according to their own will and
without pressure. This chapter places the issue under multiple theoretical perspectives to
aid in the analysis of the complex issue. First a rational-choice theory accompanied by
Pareto’s ([1916] 1935) theory of residues was used to better understand certain attitudinal
factors, and second, an insider-outsider perspective was utilized to shed light on the
complexity of ethnic belonging in Kenya and the role that it might play in voters’
behavior. The chapter that follows is a review of previous literature relating to voting
behavior and other key issues in this study.

CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
As briefly discussed in Chapter I, this study focuses on feelings of freedom to
vote according to one’s own will among Kenyan voters. Through this study I seek to find
out the extent to which five specific factors affect how Kenyans feel about their freedom
to express their personal views through voting. The factors considered include perceived
corruption in the government, trust in the national government, fear of political violence
and intimidation, ethnicity, and whether voters feel that the 2007 elections were free and
fair.
This section highlights important research previously conducted on areas related
to this study. The first section describes the political situation and key past elections in
Kenya. This section is followed by a brief overview of previous research on corruption
and political trust. Finally, the last two sections will look at voting behavior, with the last
section placing emphasis on voting as it relates to ethnicity.
Road to Democracy: Past Elections
Kenya’s electoral history has shown that the road to becoming a free and
independent state does not occur without struggle. Although attaining its independence in
1963, the second half of the 20th century in Kenya is evidence that democracy is far from
easy to achieve and even harder to maintain. Kenya’s first attempt at a multi-party
government was not made until 1992, thirty years after its independence. Although the
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government was formed of multiple coalitions, it was extremely fragmented; and the
elections were far from fair and democratic (Throup 1993). The 1992 elections brought
hope of democracy to Kenyans, who were growing increasingly disenchanted with
President Daniel Arap Moi, who had been in power since 1978. Even though an effort
was made at having fair and democratic elections in 1992, they did not happen without
political killings.
The government that was formed from the 1992 general elections was deeply
fragmented, mainly due to the facts that the elections were a product of violence between
opposition groups and the end result was achieved through fixed elections (Throup 1993).
As a result President Moi remained in power, but the legitimacy of his power was
weakened while the opposition parties were extremely fragmented and volatile, which
combination made for a very inefficient government (Throup). The elections of 1992
shed light on the nature of an electoral process that was supposed to be fair and just. After
a failed attempt to use their free will to get rid of President Moi and form a new
government, these elections left many citizens of Kenya disillusioned (Throup). President
Moi ruled Kenya until stepping down in 2002 (CIA The World Factbook 2010).
The 2002 elections in Kenya marked what was meant to be a turn toward
democracy and an end to an era of corruption within the national government. A new
government was formed with a new leader in office, and by 2003 there was a 78 percent
rate of satisfaction with democracy among the citizens of Kenya (Afrobarometer Briefing
Paper No 25 2006). This positive outlook, however, did not last long. By 2005 the same
survey showed a drop to a 53 percent rate of satisfaction with democracy
(Afrobaromerter Briefing Paper No 25 2006). Although the 2002 elections were won on
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an anticorruption campaign (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 26 2008), a briefing paper
published by Afrobarometer, “Corruption in Kenya, 2005: Is NARC Fulfilling Its
Campaign Promise?” suggests that Kenya’s end to corruption is yet to come. After
analyzing the results from the Afrobarometer survey conducted in Kenya in 2005, these
researchers have concluded that the citizens of Kenya do not feel that there has been very
much progress, if any, in the alleged efforts made by the government to tackle corruption
(Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 48 2006). Further research from the same institution
conducted on the following elections showed little improvement.
Briefing paper, “Ethnicity and Violence in the 2007 Elections in Kenya,”
(Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 48 2006) looks at the results of a detailed survey that
was given to citizens of Kenya immediately before the elections took place. This was
done to gain an insight into voters’ intentions and feelings toward violence and
corruption in relation to the upcoming elections. In this survey the respondents were
asked whether they felt that the elections were going to be free and fair, and 70 percent of
the respondents said that they “expected some problems,” while around 50 percent
“expected major problems or worse” (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 26 2008).
Public Opinion and Attitudes: Perceived Corruption and Political Trust
In analyzing voting freedom it is imperative to take a close look at corruption and
the role it plays in affecting voters. One of the hypotheses of this study contends that
voters of Kenya will feel less free to vote according to their own will if they feel that
there is a high level of corruption in the government. In other words, perceived corruption
will have a negative effect on feelings of freedom to vote without reservation. As defined
by Chang and Kerr (2009:4) perceived corruption refers to “the degree to which citizens
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believe that a political actor or entity is involved in corrupt practices.” Corruption, in
contrast, refers to the “the abuse of public power for some private benefit,” as defined by
Canache and Allison (2005:91). Chang and Kerr (2009) make a key point in stressing the
importance of conceptualizing the perception of corruption and differentiating it from
corruption. Whether or not there really is corruption in government does not matter in
terms of voting behavior if the people are not aware of it. Consequently, in this study I
account only for the perceived levels of corruption because it is the perception of the
amount of corruption in which the government is involved that affects how people feel
about voting.
Findings by Seligson (2002) and Treisman (2007) suggest that perceived
corruption is not linked to real corruption through evidence so it is important to take into
account the fact that citizens’ personal estimates of the amount of corruption and the
actual amount of corruption are by no means equal. Canache and Allison (2005) further
discuss this issue, and they make two important points in relation to the necessity for the
distinction between perceived corruption and actual corruption. First, they stress the need
for citizens to be able to have an accurate perception of actual corruption. If voters
thought all politicians were corrupt, democracy and democratic elections would be
pointless. Second, it is imperative that citizens are able to aim their perception of
corruption accurately and at the right people; otherwise the democratic political system
would again be undermined.
This study focuses specifically on the perception that citizens have of the amount
of corruption that goes on in the Kenyan government. Although much research has been
conducted on corruption, few studies relate it to feelings of freedom to vote according to
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one’s own personal views. Research has been conducted, however, linking corruption
with trust in government, another key variable. Canache and Allison’s (2005) study
connects perception of corruption with public opinion, arguing that the former can have a
significant effect on the latter, and it can ultimately affect democratic processes such as
elections. This type of research portrays the magnitude of the role that public opinion and
attitudes can have on the electoral outcomes, thus showing the importance of the topic
under study.
In a study done in Mexico, Morris (1991) focused specifically on perception of
corruption, and he finds a strong relationship between perception of the existence of
corruption and low trust in government. Della Porta (2000) finds that citizens’ trust in
government and its capacity to meet the people’s needs is undermined greatly by
corruption. Although the direct relationship between corruption and trust in government
is not the focus of this study, I hypothesize that both of these factors are associated with
citizens’ feelings of personal freedom to vote. In terms of political trust, I suspect that it
plays a significant role in shaping people’s feelings about voting and their voting
behavior. Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) tested whether attitudes such as political trust
have a significant effect on voting participation in Africa, and they did not find a
significant relationship. Their results are consistent with previous findings on the same
topic (Bratton 1999). These results do not undermine the hypotheses of this study because
I do not seek to determine whether attitudes such as political trust affect voting
participation. Rather, I am interested in finding the extent to which these attitudes affect
how citizens of Kenya feel about their freedom to vote. The fact that political trust is not
a significant factor driving voters to the booths is important to keep in mind, but it does
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not tell us whether deciding for whom to vote is affected by these attitudes once at the
booth.
Although previous research suggests that political trust does not affect whether a
person decides to vote or not, whether to vote and how to vote are two completely
different decisions. Consequently, I still hypothesize that political trust does affect voters’
feelings about their freedom to express their opinion through voting, even if political trust
is not related to the initial decision process that voters undergo when deciding to vote or
not to vote. Thus, in relation to these findings, I hope to find out whether political trust
affects the way people feel about their freedom to vote as they wish.
Some of these studies previously mentioned also analyze variables that will be
included as control variables in this study. Canache and Allison (2005) find that, in their
study of Latin American countries, factors such as sex, age, education, and social class
are all significantly associated with perception of corruption. This study will control for
all those variables in order to see whether they help explain feelings of freedom to vote.
The following section looks at previous research relating to voting behavior.
Voting Behavior
Voting behavior and patterns in voting have been a focus of study for scholars
across the board of disciplines, and extensive literature exists on the issue from research
conducted on a variety of different countries. There seems to be widespread consensus
that, as Keunzi and Lambright (2005:14) point out, “political efficacy is regularly linked
to political participation.” In an earlier study done in the United States, Palfrey and
Poole’s (1987) findings support this claim, arguing that levels of political knowledge are
significantly correlated with an individual’s likelihood to vote. Furthermore, they find
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that there is a positive relationship between political knowledge and predictability in
voting behavior. That is, voting behavior is far more predictable for individuals who are
informed than for those who are uninformed.
Previous studies have been done relating to voting in Africa, and they find that
there is not a difference in levels of political knowledge between voters and nonvoters
(Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005). The fact that
these findings are supported by multiple researchers is puzzling because it does not
comply with the patterns found by previous research in relation to political knowledge
and voting participation. Kuenzi and Lambright explain that this could be logically
explained if voting in Africa is driven by outside forces such as patronage and other
forces that mobilize voters. These outside factors make voting behavior in Africa unique
in that political knowledge cannot be used as an accurate measure of political
participation, nor can one rely on it to predict voting patterns. Instead, to understand
Kenya’s voting behavior, other factors must be taken into account.
In Kenya factors affecting voting behavior include vote buying and clientelism
among other things. Kramon (2009) argues that, after studying survey data from the 2002
elections, vote buying is very much a pertinent force affecting voter turnout in Kenyan
elections. This is important to take into consideration. To learn the extent to which voters
in Kenya feel free to express their own opinion through voting, I assume that they are
voting freely in the first place. I assume this because Kenya’s electoral system is driven
by democratic values; but, in the case in which people are forced to vote, I expect that
this will be manifested in answers to the survey question relating to feelings about
freedom to voice one’s own opinion through voting. The way I rationalize this is that, if
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people are being forced to vote, they will be forced to do so one way or another, thereby
not being free to vote according to their own will. Thus, I do not find whether someone is
being motivated to participate in elections a necessary variable in my study, but I do urge
future research to look into the topic.
This is also true for other motivating factors such as clientelism; previous
research suggests that some form of patron-client relationship in which favors are granted
in exchange for votes is popular among African voters (Lindberg and Morrison 2008;
Young 2009). With this said, Lindberg and Morrison challenge the notion that forces of
clientelism are still significantly affecting voting behavior. Although future research is
needed in this area, for the purpose of this study I assume that, if clientelism is present
and significant in Kenyan elections, respondents will portray this through answering
truthfully when asked about their voting behavior and freedom to vote according to their
own personal views.
Another crucial factor of this research is the notion of ethnic voting. Lindberg and
Morrison find that, like clientelism, a significant amount of Ghanians’ voting behavior is
motivated by ethnicity. Much research has been conducted on the issue of ethnicity in
Africa, which is mentioned in the following section.
Ethnicity and Voting
As proven by the 2007 post-election violence, ethnic identity is a major issue in
Kenya today and quite relevant in any study relating to the national elections. Because
ethnic identity is such an influential factor in Kenyan politics, it is only fair that it plays a
major role in shaping the research question of this study, and without paying close
attention to its effect on voting behavior this study would be incomplete.
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According to the CIA World Factbook (2010), Kenya’s population is 39 million
people. Although there are more than 70 different ethnic groups in Kenya, 70 percent of
the population belongs to the five biggest ethnic groups. The largest ethnic group is
Kikuyu, which constitutes about 22 percent of the total population; the next four biggest
groups are Luo (14%), Luhya(13%), Kalenjin (12%), and Kamba (11%) (CIA The
World… 2010). Kenya’s ethnic groups can be divided into three broad linguistic groups,
the Bantu, the Nilotes, and the Cushites (CIA The World… 2010). The Kikuyu fall into
the Bantu category, and although they make up a mere fifth of the total population, they
are overwhelmingly dominant in terms of representation and influence in the political
realm (African Studies Center 2010). It is worth noting that Kenya’s first president, Mzee
Jomo Kenyatta, as well as the current president, Mwai Kibaki, both belong to the Kikuyu
ethnic group (African Studies Center 2010).
As mentioned briefly in the previous section, Kenya’s first true attempt at a
democratic government came with elections in 1992. One of the consequences of having
multiparty elections for the first time in 1992 was ethnic grouping in voting behavior, and
this became a pattern mirrored in the 1997 elections (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). This
has led many to believe that Kenya’s elections revolve mainly around cultural and ethnic
factors. This is known as an “ethnic census,” a term coined by Donald Horowitz (1985),
and it refers to elections that take place as a mere formality and are easily predicted
because of ethnic cohesions (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008:3). Many scholars agree that
ethnic identity is the single major factor affecting voting behavior in societies that are
extremely fragmented ethnically (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008).

24
With this said, Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) argue that the 2002 elections as well
as the 2007 elections in Kenya have shown that ethnicity is not the only important factor
affecting Kenyans and their voting patterns. While the researchers do not completely
disregard ethnicity as a driving factor in voting behavior, they find that it is neither the
only factor nor necessarily the most important one. In their study they find that policy
issues sometimes trump ethnic background in making voting decisions, especially among
people who do not identify themselves in terms of ethnic groups within Kenya.
Norris and Mattes’ (2003) earlier study supports these findings. They agree that
ethnolinguistic factors are major players in voting behavior, but they are interested in
finding the extent to which this holds true and whether structural factors play an
equivalent role in party identification. Although Kenya was not included in their study,
their findings suggest that ethnic and linguistic factors do influence party identification
and voting behavior significantly in many countries in Africa, but not all. Other recent
studies have found that issues relating to the national economy and personal-economic
well being trump ethnic identity in some African countries (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008).
Feelings of Freedom to Vote: Unanswered Questions
Canache and Allison (2005) find evidence that perception of corruption has a
direct and significant effect on public opinion and on the way people vote. From this they
conclude that elected officials that engage in politically corrupt activities do so at their
own risk because according to their results citizens that acknowledge corruption would
vote against it. I, however, wonder whether there are other factors in addition to that
perceived corruption and political support. Do citizens who think that there are high
levels of corruption fear voting freely? In other words, does perception of corruption as

25
well as fear of being subject to political violence or intimidation affect the way voters
feel about being free to vote without reservation? In addition, does political trust and
one’s ethnic identity play a role in affecting voters’ opinion, aside from their knowledge
about corruption within the government? These are among the main questions that this
research seeks to answer.
Conclusion
The topic of voting has been a popular area of research for decades. Because
African countries have recently made a transition toward democratization, research
specific to this continent is limited. Much of the research conducted thus far has been
done using the data from the Afrobarometer Survey. The focus of my study looks at
feelings of freedom to vote according to one’s own will and the extent to which this is
affected by perception of corruption, trust in the government, fear of being subject to
political violence or intimidation, and ethnic identity. While much research has been done
on most of these topics individually, I have yet to find studies that connect any of these
studies with my dependent variable.
In summary, most research conducted suggests that African countries are
struggling to keep the process of democratization smooth and peaceful. Corruption has
been a part of many of these governments since the beginning, and it will take more than
one peaceful election to change this. Studies are needed in all areas related to voting
behavior. In addition, because of the changing nature of the governments, comparative
research will be needed in the future. The following section describes the methodology
employed in this study.

CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH METHODS
In this chapter I give a description of the data and the survey that were used for
this study. Next is a brief section stating the hypotheses of my research, which is
followed by a detailed description of the dependent and independent variables. This
section ends with an explanation of the analysis employed.
Data
This research study utilizes data from the fourth round of the Afrobarometer
Survey collected in Kenya. Afrobarometer is an independent project that collects data
from African countries to gain insight into their political, social, and economic lives. The
Afrobarometer surveys and collects data in waves, and for this project I will use the most
recent 2008 wave, which is composed of 1,104 respondents.
To collect the data, Afrobarometer uses in-depth interviews as well as surveys
provided to national probability samples. The goal of this project was to gather data
regarding sociopolitical issues in relation to national elections from a representative
national sample of the voting population in Kenya. The respondents were asked to answer
more than 100 questions, whereby the 331 variables that make up the dataset were
created. This study analyzes the relationship between freedom to vote without pressure
and perception of corruption, trust in national government, fear of being subject to
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political violence and intimidation, ethnicity, and whether or not the participants feel that
the last elections were free and fair.
Hypotheses
Five initial hypotheses were drawn regarding the relationships between the
dependent variable and each independent variable:
H1: Kenyan voters will be more likely to feel free to vote for whom they choose if
they have a low perception of corruption within the government.
H2: The higher the level of Kenyan voters’ trust in the government is, the more
likely it is that they will feel free to vote for whom they choose without
pressure.
H3: The more Kenyan voters fear being subject to political violence or
intimidation, the less likely they are to feel free to vote for whom they
choose.
H4: Kenyan voters who believe that in their country elections are free and fair
will be more likely to feel free to vote for whom they chose without pressure.
H5: Members of the four dominant Kenyan tribes feel freer to vote according to
their own preference than do members of other ethnic groups.
The data in Table 1 show the descriptive statistics of the six variables used in this
study. This table includes the dependent variable, the five independent variables, and the
control variables. It is directly followed by a brief description of each variable, beginning
with the dependent variable.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
obs.

Mean

Var.

Median

Min

Max.

1088

.79

.40

.16

1.00

.00

1.00

915

.00

.88

.78

-.121

-2.11

2.47

Trust in
Government

1029

.00

.84

.71

0.00

-1.72

1.61

Fear of Political
Violence and
Intimidation

1094

1.18

1.2

1.25

1.00

.00

3.00

Dominant Tribe

1097

.35

.48

.23

0.00

.00

1.00

2007 Free and
Fair

1081

1.78

.77

.59

2.00

1.00

3.00

Freedom to
Choose for
Whom to Vote
Perceived
Corruption

St. Dev

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable used in this research is “Freedom to choose for whom to
vote.” The original question in the survey asked “in this country, how free are you to
choose who to vote for without feeling pressured (Afrobarometer Codebook p. 10).” This
variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable. This was done because in its original
form, some of the response categories were very small. The response categories of the
original variable include 1. “Not at all free,” 2. “Not very free,” 3. “Somewhat free,” 4.
“Completely free.” As shown in Table 2, the first three response categories, “not at all
free,” “not very free,” and “somewhat free” were combined into “not completely free,”
which together represent 20.3 percent of the respondents. The “completely free”
response category was left intact representing 79.4 percent of the participants. This
variable includes 1,088 respondents of the original 1,104, with the missing values making
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up a small 1.4 percent. The descriptive statistics of this variable are shown on Table 1,
and include a mean of .79 and a standard deviation of .40. The section that follows
discusses the independent variables.
Table 2. Frequency Distribution: Freedom to Choose for Whom to Vote
Freedom to Choose for Whom to Vote

Freq.

Not Completely Free
Completely Free
Total

224
864
1088

Percent

Cum.

20.3
79.4
98.6

20.6
100.0

Independent Variables
This study will include five independent variables. The first is perceived
corruption; the second is trust in government; the third is fear of political intimidation or
violence; the fourth is ethnicity; and the last one is free and fair elections.
Perceived Corruption
The first independent variable is “perceived corruption in the government,” which
was created by combining four variables. To measure perceived corruption I used four
questions that asked the participants about their views on the amount of corruption
currently present in a particular office/institution in the government: “How many of the
following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough
about them to say. (Afrobarometer Codebook p. 24)”
Q1: The President and Officials in His Office?
Q2: The Prime Minister and Officials in His Office?
Q3: Members of Parliament?
Q4: Government Officials?
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All the questions have the same valid response categories which were “none,”
“some of them,” “most of them,” and “all of them.” The fact that these variables are all
measured in the same way allows me to easily combine them and calculate an average to
create the scale “perceived corruption in government.” However, to create this scale, it
must be shown that the questions that I want to combine are related to each other and that
the scale would be unidimensional. The first requirement is met through the reliability
test conducted. This was done to check how closely related the variables of the group are
to each other. The data in Table 2 in Appendix A show that the Chronbach’s alpha for
this group of variables is .771, which is evidence that there is internal reliability as
anything above .70 is an acceptable reliability coefficient (Santos 1999). In other words,
the variables are highly related to each other.
The second requirement was met through factor analysis, which checks the
dimensionality of the group of variables. The data in Table 3 show the total variance
explained by the group of variables. We can see that the Eigen-value in the first
component is the only one above one, and it accounts for 46.053 percent of the variance.
This is evidence that the scale is unidimensional. For more details on this test see
Appendix A.
The valid response categories for all four variables were the same, and included:
“none,” “some of them,” “most of them,” “all of them,” and “don’t know.” For frequency
distributions of each of these variables please see Appendix C. This scale includes 915
participants and has a standard deviation of .88. More details on the descriptive statistics
of this scale can be found in Table 1.
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Table 3. Total Variance Explained
Comp
Onents
1
2
3
4

Initial Eigen Values
Total
2.374
0.702
0.492
0.432

% of Variance
59.351
17.546
12.301
10.803

Cum. %
59.351
76.897
89.197
100

Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
Total
% of Variance
Cum. %
1.842
46.053
46.053

Trust in Government
The second independent variable is “trust in government.” This variable was
created by the same process as was used to create the “perceived corruption” scale. It is a
compilation of a set of questions asked in the survey in relation to political trust. The four
original questions combined all ask the same question about different political
leaders/institutions. The survey asked, “How much do you trust each of the following, or
haven’t you heard enough about them to say: (Afrobarometer Codebook p. 23)”
Q1: The President?
Q2: The Prime Minster?
Q3: Parliament?
Q4: The Electoral Commission of Kenya?
The valid response categories for all five questions are the same, and they include: “not at
all,” “just a little,” “somewhat,” “a lot,” and “don’t know/haven’t heard enough.” For
frequency distributions of each of these variables see Appendix D. The same process was
followed to ensure reliability and unidimensionality. The data in Table 2 of Appendix B
show that the variables are related to each other with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.687.
The group of variables is shown to be unidimensional through the factor analysis
statistics shown by the data in Table 4. The Eigen value of the first component is the only
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one above one. Furthermore, component one is responsible for 36.626 percent of the
variance. For more details on this test see Appendix B. This scale includes 1,029
participants, and has a standard deviation of .88. More details on the descriptive statistics
of this scale can be found on Table 1.
Table 4. Total Variance Explained
Comp
Onents
1
2
3
4

Initial Eigen Values
Total
2.075
.897
.568
.460

% of Variance
51.869
22.432
14.195
11.504

Cum. %
51.869
74.301
88.496
100

Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
Total
% of Variance
Cum. %
1.465
36.626
36.626

Fear of Political Violence or Intimidation
The third independent variable included in this analysis is “fear of political
violence or intimidation,” which measures the extent to which people fear being
subjected to political violence or intimidation. The original survey question asked the
respondents the following question: “During election campaigns in this country, how
much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?
(Afrobarometer Codebook p. 22)” The valid response categories for this variable are: “a
lot,” “somewhat,” “a little bit,” “not at all.”
Table 5. Frequency Distribution: Fear of Political Violence/Intimidation
Fear of Political Violence/Intimidation

Freq.

A lot
Somewhat
A little bit
Not at all
Total

413
265
225
191
1094

Percent

Cum.

37.8
24.2
20.6
17.5
100

37.8
62
82.5
100
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The data in Table 5 show the frequency distributions of this variable. A total of
1,094 participants was included in this variable, leaving out .9 percent as missing values.
Descriptive statistics for this variable can be found in Table 1 and include a mean of 1.18
and a standard deviation of 1.11.
Dominant Tribe
“Dominant Tribe” is the fourth independent variable used in this research. The
original survey question asked the participants “What is your tribe? You know, your
ethnic or cultural group.” (Afrobarometer Codebook p. 47) The response categories of the
original variable include over twenty different tribes. For this study a dummy variable
was created, but a frequency distribution table can be found in Appendix E. The dummy
variable created is a dichotomous variable, with one category being a combination of the
dominant tribal groups in Kenya and the other category a combination of nondominant
tribes. The “dominant tribes” category includes the Kikuyu, Kamba, Meru , and Embu
tribes. A total of 1,097 participants were included in this dummy variable, leaving out .6
percent as missing values. The data in Table 6 show the frequency distribution of this
variable. The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1 and include a mean of 0.35
and a standard deviation of 0.48.
Table 6. Frequency Distribution: Dominant Tribes
Dominant Tribes

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

Non-Dominant Tribes
Dominant Tribes (Kikuyu,Kamba,
Meru, and Embu)
Total

709

64.2

64.2

388

35.4

99.4

1097

99.4
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Free and Fair Elections 2007
The fifth and last independent variable included in this research is “Free and Fair
Elections.” This variable measures the extent to which voters in Kenya feel that the past
elections held in Kenya in 2007 were free and fair. The original survey asked the
participants, “On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last
national election, held in 2007?” (Afrobarometer Codebook 2008: 39) The original
response categories for this question include: 1. “not free and fair,” 2. free and fair, with
major problems,” 3. “free and fair, but with minor problems,” and 4. “completely free
and fair.” This variable was recoded by combining the categories “free and fair, with
minor problems” and “completely free and fair” into one category. This was done
because “completely free” alone accounted for only an extremely small percentage of the
total population.
The data in Table 7 show the frequency distributions of this variable. This
variable includes 1,081 participants and has a mean of 1.78 and a standard deviation of
0.77. For more details on the descriptive statistics of this variable see Table 1. A brief
description of additional control variables follows.
Table 7. Frequency Distribution: Free and Fair Elections 2007
Elections Free and Fair

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

Not Free and Fair
Free and Fair, with Major Problems
Free and Fair, with Minor Problems or
Completely Free
Total

463
394

42.8
36.4

42.8
79.3

224

20.7

100

1081

100
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Control Variables
Thus far a description of the dependent and independent variables used in the
analysis of this research has been provided. Besides these, three control variables were
also included in the analysis, which include “education,” “gender,” and “age.” Table 8
provides the descriptive statistics of each.
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables

Education

obs.
1100

Mean
3.77

St. Dev
1.808

Variance
3.271

Median
4.00

Gender

1104

1.50

.500

2.50

Age

1100

35.0309 12.35621

152.676

Min

Max.
0

9

2.00

1

2

32.000

18

67

The first control variable, education, includes 1,100 participants, and the original
survey asked the respondents “what is the highest level of education you have
completed? (Afrobarometer Codebook 2008:49)” The response categories range from
“no formal schooling” to “post-graduate.” For details on the frequency distribution of this
variable see Table 2 in Appendix F. The data in Table 8 show that the descriptive
statistics of this variable include a mean of 3.77 and a standard deviation of 1.81.
The next control variable included in this research is gender. The original survey
asked the participants to indicate their gender, and all 1,104 respondents were included in
this variable. The response categories included “male” and “female,” with males making
up 49.8 percent of the total population and females 50.2 percent. A frequency distribution
table can be found in Table 1 in Appendix F. Table 8 indicates that this variable has a
mean of 1.50 and a standard deviation of .50.
Last, the variable “age” was used as a control variable. The original survey
question asked the respondents to indicate their age, and 1,100 participants were included
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in this variable. The response categories ranged from “18” to “95,” but this variable was
recoded into categories ranging from “18” – “67” due to the low number of cases that
indicated being an age older than 67. For a frequency distribution of this variable see
Table 3 in Appendix F. The data in Table 8 show that the variable age has a mean of
35.03 and a standard deviation of 12.36.
Analysis
As stated previously, in conducting this research I sought to find out the extent to
which citizens of Kenya feel free to vote for whom they choose without pressure during
national elections. In addition, I want to know what role certain factors, the independent
variables, play in establishing these feelings of freedom or lack thereof. To obtain these
results I have conducted both bivariate and multivariate analyses. First I used a
correlation matrix to determine the individual relationship between the dependent
variable and each independent variable. Second, I conducted logistic regression analysis
to predict the extent to which the combination of the independent variables explains
freedom to vote in Kenya according to one’s preference and without pressure.
As explained by Dayton (1992), logistic regression analysis is best suited for
“research situations in which the outcome variable is categorical. [www.bus.utk.edu;
para. 1]” LRA works by basing the probabilities on the values of the dependent variable;
and because it is the case for most situations, the dependent variable is assumed to be
dichotomous. For this study the dependent variable, feelings of freedom to vote in
Kenya, is a dichotomous variable, and so logistic regression analysis was employed.
Four different logistic regression models were conducted. Model 1 includes only
the independent variables that relate to attitudes. Model 2 combines the attitudinal and
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demographic variables. Model 3 also includes squared variables of perceived corruption
and perceived trust. This is done as a requirement for Model 4, which has two additional
interaction terms. To run a regression model with interaction terms, one must first check
to see whether the squared terms of the variable affect the model (Ganzach 1998). The
squared terms included in Model 3 are of perceived corruption and trust in government.
Then, in Model 4 perceived corruption and trust in government are combined
with dominant tribe to create two interaction terms. This is done to account for the
possible effect that dominant tribe might have on the results. As established by the theory
section and the review of literature, ethnicity is a major player in Kenyan elections. In
this study the centrality of ethnicity is portrayed through H5, in which being a member of
a dominant tribe is the key factor. Thus, by creating interaction terms of dominant tribe,
Model 4 accounts for the possible effect produced by voters who are both, a member of a
dominant tribe in Kenyan, and, either perceive high levels of corruption or have high
levels of trust in the government.

CHAPTER V
ANALYSES
In short, this study seeks to determine the extent to which certain attitudinal and
demographic factors play a role in Kenyan voters’ feelings of freedom to vote without
pressure. This chapter takes a closer look at both the bivariate and multivariate analyses
used to test the hypotheses. More important, this chapter includes a detailed explanation
of the results of the analyses to determine whether my hypotheses are supported by the
data. Finally, these results are used to draw some conclusions and make implications
about the topic under research. The bivariate analysis is the first test of the hypotheses.
Bivariate Analysis: Correlation Matrix
First a correlation matrix was created to examine the bivariate relationships
between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The data in Table 9 show
the correlations between the attitudinal independent variables and feelings of freedom to
vote. Attitudinal variables refer to perceived corruption, trust in government, fear of
political violence and intimidation, and perception of free and fair elections in 2007.
The data in Table 9 show that none of the correlations between the dependent
variable and the independent variables are significant. However, it does show that all
independent variables are highly correlated with each other. Each relationship is
significant at the .001 level except that between perceived corruption and fear of political
violence or intimidation, which is significant at the .01 level. The data in Table 9 also
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show that the relationships between perceived corruption and the rest of the attitudinal
variables are all negative, which means that as voters perceive more corruption there is a
decrease in trust in the government, fear of being subject to political violence or
intimidation, and the chances that they thought the 2007 elections would be free and fair
prior to taking place. The strongest of these relationships is the one between perceived
corruption and trust in government, with a Pearson’s Correlation of -.384. The fact that
the relationship between perceived corruption and fear of political violence and
intimidation is negative is interesting because it suggests that when perceived corruption
is high, fear is low or vice versa. With this said, this relationship is weak, with a Person’s
correlation of -.100.
Table 9. Correlation Matrix: Dependent Variable and Attitudinal Variables
Freedom Perceived
to Vote Corruption
Freedom
Pearson’s R
1
-.010
to Vote
Sig. 2-tail
.754
N
1088
903
Perceived
Pearson’s R
-.010
1
Corruption Sig. 2-tail
.754
N
903
915
Trust in
Pearson’s R
.040
-.384
Gov.
Sig. 2-tail
.200
***.000
N
1017
883
Fear Pol.
Pearson’s R
-.026
-.100
Violence
Sig. 2-tail
.393
**.002
N
1080
907
Free/Fair
Pearson’s R
-.005
-.162
2007
Sig. 2-tail
.858
***.000
N
1067
902
*
**
***
NOTE: p < .05, p < .01, p < .001

Trust in
Gov.
.040
.200
1017
-.384
***.000
883
1
1029
.126
***.000
1021
.270
***.000
1013

Fear Pol. Free/Fair
Violence
2007
-.026
-.005
.393
.858
1080
1067
-.100
-.162
**.002 ***.000
907
902
.126
.270
***.000 ***.000
1021
1013
1
.106
***.001
1094
1071
.106
1
***.001
1071

The data in Table 10 show the correlation matrix between the demographic and
the attitudinal variables. First, they indicate that freedom to vote is significantly and
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positively correlated with education at the .01 level with a p-value of .006. This implies
that the higher the level of education that voters have completed, the freer they will feel
to vote according to their own will.
Table 10. Correlation Matrix: Demographic and Attitudinal Variables
Freedom Perceived
to Vote Corruption
Dominant
Pearson’s R
.007
.126
Tribe
Sig. 2-tail
.809
***.000
N
1081
909
Education Pearson’s R
.083
.105
Sig. 2-tail
**.006
***.001
N
1085
911
Gender
Pearson’s R
-.044
-.023
Sig. 2-tail
.151
.484
N
1088
915
Age
Pearson’s R
-.032
-.040
Sig. 2-tail
.287
.231
N
1084
912
*
**
***
NOTE: p < .05, p < .01, p < .001

Trust in
Gov.
.066
*.036
1022
-.140
***.000
1026
.006
.837
1029
.090
**.004
1026

Fear Pol. Free/Fair
Violence
2007
.090
.249
**.003 ***.000
1087
1074
.063
.039
*.037
.194
1093
1090
.015
-.042
.630
.168
1097
1094
-.042
.047
.161
.120
1093
1090

Another important variable included in Table 10 is dominant tribe. As described
in the previous chapter, the variable of dominant tribe divides voters into those who
belong to the four main ethnic tribes in Kenya and those who do not. Although the
correlation matrix table does not show an association between dominant tribe and the
dependent variable, it does show that belonging to a dominant tribe in Kenya is
significantly associated with all attitudinal variables included in the study. In addition, the
data in Table 10 show that trust in government is positively correlated with all
demographic variables except gender. This implies that being older, having higher levels
of education completed, and belonging to a dominant tribe are all associated with having
more trust in the government.
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Table 11 is a continuation of the correlation matrix, portraying the correlations
between the demographic variables and how they are correlated with each other. The data
in Table 11 show that being a member of a dominant tribe is correlated only with
education, which suggests that those who have higher education are more likely to belong
to a dominant tribe in Kenya. This relationship is very weak, with a Pearson’s correlation
of .063, but it is significant at the .05 level with a p-value of. 037. Education, gender, and
age are all associated with each other and are significant at the .001 level. All three
relationships are negative but weak, which suggests that, in Kenya, both males and
younger people achieve higher levels of education.
Table 11. Correlation Matrix: Demographic Variables
Dominant
Tribe
1

Dominant Pearson’s R
Tribe
Sig. 2-tail
N
1097
.063
Education Pearson’s R
*.037
Sig.
1093
N
.015
Gender
Pearson’s R
.630
Sig.
1097
N
-.042
Age
Pearson’s R
.161
Sig.
1093
N
*
**
***
NOTE: p < .05, p < .01, p < .001

Education
.063
*.037
1093
1
1100
-.114
***.000
1100
-.203
***.000
1096

Gender
.015
.630
1097
-.114
***.000
1100
1
1104
-.130
***.000
1100

Age
-.042
.161
1093
-.203
***.000
1096
-.130
***.000
1100
1
1100

Multivariate Analysis: Logistic Regression
Next, a logistic regression analysis was conducted to help predict the extent to
which the combination of independent variables explains the dependent variable, freedom
to vote according to one’s own will and without pressure. Logistic regression models
were conducted to obtain more accurate results. The reason they are more accurate is that,
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unlike bivariate analysis, logistic regression models help predict the effect that an
independent variable has on the dependent variable while holding the rest of the
independent variables constant. In other words, while a correlation matrix can account for
only one relationship at the time, logistic regression takes into consideration all the
independent variables simultaneously, thus producing more accurate results. The data in
Table 12 show the four logistic regression models conducted in this study.
Table 12. Logistic Regression (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

(Freedom to
Vote)
Perceived
Corruption
Trust in Gov.
Fear Pol.
Violence
Free Fair 2007

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

O.R. / se

O.R. / se

O.R. / se

O.R. / se

1.059

1.022

1.034

1.142

(.107)
*1.303
(.118)

(.109)
*1.278
(.119)

(.122)
*1.305
(.125)

(.151)
1.149
(.147)

.867

*.855

*.851

.844

(.078)
.906
(.120)

(.079)
.927
(.125)
1.030
(.196)
1.083
(.051)
.792
(.178)
1.001
(.008)

(.080)
.923
(.125)
1.024
(.198)
1.087
(.052)
.801
(.179)
1.002
(.008)
1.117
(.114)
.984
.076

.015

0.022

0.023

(.081)
*.890
(.125)
1.096
(.204)
1.076
(.052)
.793
(.180)
1.000
(.008)
1.121
(.115)
1.020
.082
1.486
0.256
0.779
0.239
0.034

Dominant Tribe
Education
Gender
Age
Trust2
Corruption2
Etrust
Ecorruption
Pseudo R-Squared
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Model 1
The first logistic regression model includes only the attitudinal independent
variables. Among these are perceived corruption, trust in government, fear of political
violence and intimidation, and free and fair elections in 2007. When only these variables
are included, the results support only one of my hypotheses. Trust in government has an
odds ratio of 1.303 and is statistically significant at the .05 level. This means that for
every one unit increase in trust in government, there is a 30.3 percent increase in the odds
of feeling free to vote according to personal preference. These results support H2, which
states that voters in Kenya who have higher levels of trust in the government will feel
freer to vote according to their own will.
Model 2
Model 2 is a combination of the attitudinal variables and the demographic
variables. The results in Model 2 support both H2 and H3.
First, trust in government has an odds ratio of 1.278, which suggests that for every
one unit increase in trust, there is a 27.8 percent increase in the odds that voters will feel
free to vote according to their own will without pressure. This shows a small decrease of
2.2 percent in the odds ratio from that suggested in Model 1. The fact that the difference
between Model 1 and Model 2 is small justifies having Model 2 because it shows that
even when adding three variables to the model, the results still hold true, and they vary
only slightly. In addition, Model 2 differs from Model 1 in that it not only supports H1
but also H3. The difference between Model 1 and Model 2 could be due to the intercorrelation between the attitudinal and demographic variables. Thus, when controlling for
demographics, Model 2 reveals a new relationship.
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More specifically Model 2 shows that fear of political violence and intimidation is
statistically significant at the .05 level. This variable has an odds ratio of .855, which
suggests that for every one unit increase in fear there is a 14.5 percent lesser odds that
voters will feel that yes, they are free to vote according to their own will. These results
support H3, in which I hypothesize that voters in Kenya will feel freer to vote according
to their own will when they are not afraid of being subject to political violence and
intimidation. It is interesting that these results are not consistent with the correlation
matrix, which suggests that there is no association between fear of political violence and
the dependent variable. This could also be due to the intercorrelation between the
independent variables. Thus, even though the bivariate analysis suggests that a
relationship between feelings of freedom to vote and fear of political violence is not
significant, the relationship is revealed through multivariate analysis.
Model 3 and Model 4
Model 3 includes the squared terms of both perceived corruption and trust in
government. According to Ganzach (1998), to run a regression model with interaction
terms, one must first check the effects that the squared terms would have on the model.
Thus, Model 3 serves the purpose of fulfilling the requirements necessary to include
interaction terms in Model 4.
Model 4 includes all of the independent variables, the squared terms of perceived
corruption and trust in government, and two interaction terms of dominant tribe. The
squared terms were included because, as argued by Ganzach (1998:621),
“including quadric terms affords protection against type I and type II errors associated
with the estimation of interaction when the true model includes quadric terms.”
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An interaction term is calculated by multiplying two variables together. For this study the
purpose of the interaction terms is to see whether there is any added effect for being a
member of a dominant tribe, and it is calculated by multiplying two variables together.
The first interaction term is seen in Table 12 as “Etrust,” and the purpose behind it is to
check to see if there is any added effect for being both a member of a dominant tribe and
having high levels of trust in the government. The second interaction term is
“Ecorruption.” The purpose of this term is to check to see if being both a member of a
dominant tribe and perceiving high levels of corruption affect the model. Although
dominant tribe is not significant in the previous models, interaction terms were still
included because all of the previous models suggest that trust in government is
significant.
Model 4 shows that, when the two interaction terms are included, the results
change. Trust in government, which was significant in all the previous models, is no
longer significant. Furthermore, fear of political violence and intimidation, which was
shown to be statistically significant in Model 2 and Model 3, is also no longer statistically
significant. Instead, with the inclusion of the interaction terms, the variable relating to the
2007 elections’ freedom and fairness becomes statistically significant at the .05 level, and
it has an odds ratio of .890. This means that, according to Model 4, for every one unit
increase in the variable “free and fair elections in 2007” there are 11 percent lesser odds
that voters will feel free to vote according to their will and without pressure. These results
contradict H4, in which I initially hypothesized that those who responded that the 2007
elections would be free and fair would feel freer to vote according to their own will.
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The section that follows goes into further inquiry about the results of this study and the
implications made by them as well as the conclusions drawn.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Kenya, like many other African countries, has a long history of political turmoil.
Much of it is rooted in the power struggles between ethnic tribes. For decades now, and
since first becoming an independent state in 1963, Kenya has begun the process of
democratizing its elections with the goal of joining the Western world in the practice of
free and fair elections. To this day Kenya has yet to see elections that are not only
democratic but also peaceful. With this said, progress has been made, and the violence
that resulted from the 2007 elections is proof that the Kenyans are more than ever fed up
with tyranny and they demand freedom to choose their leaders. It was these violent
events after the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya that inspired me to do this study.
By doing this research I hoped to gain insight into Kenyan voters’ feelings of
freedom to vote for whom they choose and without pressure. Moreover, I wanted to find
out the extent to which Kenyans’ feelings about their freedom to express their opinion
through voting is affected by: (a.) perception of corruption in the government; (b.) levels
of trust in the government; (c.) fear of being subject to political violence or intimidation;
(d.) ethnic identity; and, last, (e.) whether voters thought that the 2007 elections would be
free and fair before they took place. With these variables in mind, I hypothesized that
feelings of freedom to vote in Kenya would increase if:
H1: voters perceive low levels of corruption in the government;
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H2: voters have high levels of trust in the government;
H3: voters are not afraid of being subject to political violence or intimidation;
H4: voters believed that the 2007 elections would be free and fair before they took
place; and
H5: voters belong to one of the four dominant tribes.
To do this research I have used the data set from the survey collected by the
Afrobarometer in 2008. I conducted both bivarite and multivariate analysis. More
specifically I used a correlation matrix to look at the independent relationships between
the variables, and then I conducted logistic-regression analysis to determine what factors
help explain feelings of freedom to vote according to personal preference. Four different
models were included in the logistic regression. The model that best represents this study
is Model 2 because it includes all of the independent variables and reveals which of my
hypotheses are supported. Models 3 and 4 were conducted for the purpose of checking to
see whether the interaction term of dominant tribe would help explain feelings of
freedom to vote according to personal preference, and the results suggest that interaction
term of dominant tribe did not play a significant role.
Model 2 suggests that both trust in the government and fear of being subject to
political violence and intimidation help predict voters’ perception of freedom to vote
according to their own preference, and these results support H2 and H3 of this study.
Moreover, the results of Model 2 suggest that Kenyan voters’ feelings of freedom to vote
according to their own preference increase if their levels of trust in the government also
increase and if their fear of being subject to political violence and intimidation decreases.
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The fact that perception of corruption does not help explain feelings of freedom to
vote is interesting. According to the bivariate analysis, perceived corruption is correlated
with all the attitudinal independent variables as well as with dominant tribe and
education. With this said, none of the logistic regression models suggests that perceived
corruption is an explanatory variable of feelings of freedom to vote. These results reject
H1, and no previous literature was found that linked or rejected a relationship between
feelings of freedom to vote and perception of corruption. However, the negative
relationship between perceived corruption and trust in government found by Della Porta
(2000) is supported by the results of this study. Even though perceived corruption was
not found to be a direct explanatory factor of feelings of freedom to vote according to
personal preference, because the consistency of previous results are confirmed by this
study, I suspect that perceived corruption plays a big role in voting behavior, and I urge
future research be done on this topic.
Another hypothesis that is rejected by the multivariate results is H5. According to
Model 2, being a member of a dominant tribe is not a good predictor of freedom to vote
in Kenya. This is surprising to me for the following reasons. First, the bivariate results
show that, like perceived corruption, the variable dominant tribe is correlated with all of
the attitudinal independent variables as well as education. Second, and more important,
according to previous research, ethnicity is a very important factor shaping elections in
Kenya. Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) argue that ethnic grouping in voting behavior was
responsible for the outcomes of both the 1992 and 1997 elections. They also argued that
ethnic identity is the most important factor influencing voting behavior when it comes to
elections in ethnically fragmented societies, and they are in agreement with other
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scholars. What is interesting is that Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) found that in the 2002
and 2007 elections in Kenya, ethnicity was an important factor influencing voting
behavior but no longer the only important one.
An important implication can be suggested by comparing the results of this study
with those of previous research. Bratton and Kimenyi’s (2008) results suggest a decrease
in the importance of ethnicity in voting behavior from 1992 and 1997 to 2002 and 2007.
My results further confirm this pattern, with an even larger decrease. This is true to the
extent that, according to this study, whether voters belong to a dominant tribe or not no
longer plays an explanatory role in voting behavior, at least not as it did before. If these
results are accurate, this could mean that a very important change is taking place in
Kenya. That is, if voting behavior in Kenya no longer revolves around ethnic identity and
tribal politics, this could mean a very positive social change. Moreover, it would mean
that Kenya is overcoming a major challenge when it comes to achieving the goal of
having democratic and peaceful elections.
Although the results have not supported all of the hypotheses of this study, the
research question under consideration remains how is Kenyans’ freedom to express their
own opinion through voting affected by their perception of levels of corruption in the
government, their levels of trust in the government, their fear of becoming subject to
political violence or intimidation, and, last, whether they belong to a dominant ethnic
tribe.
This research question was framed under two theoretical perspectives. First, a
rational-choice approach combined with Pareto’s ([1916] 1935) theory of residues and
derivations was applied. The implications made through the first theoretical approach
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suggested that, when making decisions about voting, voters would analyze the situation
in term of costs and benefits first, and then they would choose the path that is less costly
and most beneficial. By adding Pareto’s ([1916] 1935) notion of residues, it was
recognized that there are certain sentiments, feelings, or attitudes that play a role in
shaping the analysis of costs and benefits. The sentiments, feelings, or attitudes that I
considered are perceived corruption, trust in government, and fear of political violence or
intimidation. After the analysis was conducted, the results supported all but the
stipulation about perception of corruption. This means that, while perception of
corruption does not appear to be a driving factor in explaining the way voters in Kenya
feel about their freedom to express their opinion through voting, other factors such as
trust in government and fear of political violence do.
The second theoretical approach that was applied to help explain the issue at hand
was the insider-outsider perspective. By using this perspective I contended that, because
Kenya’s political arena has been dominated by ethnic feuds for decades, voters’ feelings
about different political parties and figures would vary depending on the ethnic tribe to
which they claimed alliance and, in turn, would affect how they felt about voting. The
results of this study do not support the implications made by this theory because they
suggest that whether a voter belongs to one of the dominant tribes in Kenya or not does
not affect how they feel about their freedom to vote. The fact that the theoretical
implications initially made in this research are not supported by the results suggests a
positive change in that Kenyans are no longer constrained by ethnic boundaries in terms
of voting. With this said, this study does have its limitations, and future research needs to
be conducted to check the reliability of the results.

52
First, the dependent variable, freedom to vote without pressure, was recoded into
a dichotomous variable. This had to be done because of the disparity in the number of
cases across the response categories. As a result, three response categories “not at all
free,” “not very free,” and “somewhat free” were combined into “not completely free.”
This is methodologically justified in Chapter IV, but future research should take this into
consideration. Next because the survey was collected in 2008, very little research has
been conducted. Thus, while the data are up to date, there is little research to back up the
findings of this study. Last, I strongly urge future research to look further into the issue of
ethnicity and voting behavior in Kenya. Although special attention was paid to the effect
that ethnicity might have on voting behavior, this was not the sole purpose of this study.
Thus, future researchers might consider making ethnicity the central focus. Even though
the results of this study do not support previous research in deeming ethnicity a key
factor in explaining voting behavior, it should still be considered in future research.

APPENDIX A
Independent Variable: Perceived Corruption
Reliability Test

Table 1. Summary Item Statistics

Item Means
Item Variances
Interitem Covariances
Interitem Correlations

Mean
1.387
.553
.253
.457

Minimum
1.190
.528
.207
.373

Maximum
1.541
.572
.307
.539

Range
.351
.044
.100
.166

Max./Min.
1.295
1.084
1.480
1.446

Table 2. Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha
.771

N of Items
4

Table 3. Summary Item Statistics

Item Means
Item Variances
Interitem Covariances
Interitem Correlations

Variance
.025
.000
.001
.005
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N of Items
4
4
4
4
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Factor Analysis

Table 4. Communalities

Corruption: Office of the Presidency
Corruption: Office of the Prime Minister
Corruption: Members of Parliament
Corruption: Government Officials

Initial
.379
.345
.390
.293

Extraction
.505
.451
.525
.361

Table 5. Total Variance Explained
Comp
Onents
1
2
3
4

Initial Eigen Values
Total
2.374
0.702
0.492
0.432

% of Variance
59.351
17.546
12.301
10.803

Cum. %
59.351
76.897
89.197
100

Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
Total
% of Variance
Cum. %
1.842
46.053
46.053

APPENDIX B
Independent Variable: Trust in Government
Reliability Test

Table 1. Summary Item Statistics

Item Means
Item Variances
Interitem Covariances
Interitem Correlations

Mean
1.491
1.046
.371
.355

Minimum
.804
.998
.155
.149

Maximum
1.926
1.106
.490
.451

Range
1.122
.108
.335
.303

Max./Min.
2.397
1.109
3.168
3.036

Table 2. Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha
0.687

N of Items
4

Table 3. Summary Item Statistics

Item Means
Item Variances
Interitem Covariances
Interitem Correlations

Variance
.235
.002
.014
.015
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N of Items
4
4
4
4
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Factor Analysis

Table 4. Communalities

Trust President
Trust Prime Minister
Trust Parliament/National Assembly
Trust Electoral Commission

Initial
.331
.262
.280
.226

Extraction
.519
.308
.379
.259

Table 5. Total Variance Explained
Comp
Onents
1
2
3
4

Initial Eigen Values
Total
2.075
.897
.568
.460

% of Variance
51.869
22.432
14.195
11.504

Cum. %
51.869
74.301
88.496
100

Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
Total
% of Variance
Cum. %
1.465
36.626
36.626

APPENDIX C
Frequency Distributions: Perceived Corruption

Table 1. Corruption: Office of the Presidency
Value Label
-1
0
1
2
3
9

Corruption: Office of the Presidency
Missing
None
Some of Them
Most of Them
All of Them
Don’t Know/Haven't Heard Enough
Total

Freq.
1
83
604
221
92
103
1104

Percent
0.09
7.52
54.71
20.02
8.33
9.33
100

Cum.
0.09
7.61
62.32
82.34
90.67
100

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

1
139
555
182
62
165
1104

0.09
12.59
50.27
16.49
5.62
14.95
100

0.09
12.68
62.95
79.44
85.05
100

Table 2. Corruption: Office of the Prime Minister
Value Label
-1
0
1
2
3
9

Corruption: Office of the Prime
minister
Missing
None
Some of Them
Most of Them
All of Them
Don’t Know/Haven't Heard Enough
Total

57
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Table 3. Corruption: Government Officials
Value Label
-1
0
1
2
3
9

Corruption: Government Officials
Missing
None
Some of Them
Most of Them
All of Them
Don’t Know/Haven't Heard Enough
Total

Freq.
2
44
497
400
105
56
1104

Percent
0.18
3.99
45.02
36.23
9.51
5.07
100

Cum.
0.18
4.17
49.18
85.42
94.93
100

Freq.
3
51
521
368
90
71
1104

Percent
0.27
4.62
47.19
33.33
8.15
6.43
100

Cum.
0.27
4.89
52.08
85.42
93.57
100

Table 4. Corruption: Members of Parliament
Value Label
-1
0
1
2
3
9

Corruption: Members of Parliament
Missing
None
Some of Them
Most of Them
All of Them
Don’t Know/Haven't Heard Enough
Total

APPENDIX D
Frequency Distributions: Trust in Government

Table 1. Trust President
Value Label
-1
0
1
2
3
9

Trust President
Missing
Not at All
Just a Little
Somewhat
A Lot
Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough
Total

Freq.
3
167
297
294
332
11
1104

Percent
0.27
15.13
26.9
26.63
30.07
1
100

Cum.
0.27
15.4
42.3
68.93
99
100

Freq.
1
120
221
336
385
41
1104

Percent
0.09
10.87
20.02
30.43
34.87
3.71
1104

Cum.
0.09
10.96
30.98
61.41
96.29

Table 2. Trust Prime Minister
Value Label
-1
0
1
2
3
9

Trust Prime Minister
Missing
Not at All
Just a Little
Somewhat
A Lot
Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough
Total

59

60
Table 3. Trust Prime Minister/National Assembly
Value Label
-1
0
1
2
3
9

Trust Parliament/National
Assembly
Missing
Not at all
Just a little
Somewhat
A Lot
Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough
Total

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

4
184
333
335
220
28
1104

0.36
16.67
30.16
30.34
19.93
2.54
100

0.36
17.03
47.19
77.54
97.46
100

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

3
581
209
173
108
30
1104

0.27
52.63
18.93
15.67
9.78
2.72
100

0.27
52.9
71.83
87.5
97.28
100

Table 4. Trust in National Electoral Commission
Value Label
-1
0
1
2
3
9

Trust in National Electoral
Commission
Missing
Not at All
Just a Little
Somewhat
A Lot
Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough
Total

APPENDIX E
Frequency Distributions: Dominant Tribe
Table 1. Tribe/Ethnic Group
Value Label
-1
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
315
317
318
320
321
322
323
990
995
998

Q79 Tribe/Ethnic Group
Missing
Kikuyu
Luo
Luhya
Kamba
Meru
Kisii
Kalenjin
Masai
Mijikenda
Taita
Somali
Pokot
Turkana
Bajuni
Teso
Embu
Borana
Arab
Swahili
Indian
Gabra
Kenyan Only or "Doesn’t
Think of Self in Those
Terms"
Others
Refused
Total

61

Freq.
6
208
135
136
116
55
66
128
21
32
27
96
12
9
3
8
9
2
3
4
2
7

Percent
0.54
18.84
12.23
12.32
10.51
4.98
5.98
11.59
1.9
2.9
2.45
8.7
1.09
0.82
0.27
0.72
0.82
0.18
0.27
0.36
0.18
0.63

Cum.
0.54
19.38
31.61
43.93
54.44
59.42
65.4
76.99
78.89
81.79
84.24
92.93
94.02
94.84
95.11
95.83
96.65
96.83
97.1
97.46
97.64
98.28

6
12
1
1104

0.54
1.09
0.09
100

98.82
99.91
100

APPENDIX F
Frequency Distributions: Control Variables

Table 1. Gender
Value Label
Gender
1
Male
2
Female
Total

Freq.
550
554
1104

Percent
49.82
50.18
100

Cum.
49.82
100

Table 2. Education
Value Label
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Education
Missing
No Formal Schooling
Informal Schooling Only
Some Primary Schooling
Primary School Completed
Some Secondary School/High School
Secondary School Completed/High
School
Post-Secondary Qualifications, Not
University
Some University
University Completed
Post Graduate
Total

62

Freq.
4
63
24
202
216
163

Percent
0.36
5.71
2.17
18.3
19.57
14.76

Cum.
0.36
6.07
8.24
26.54
46.11
60.87

244

22.1

82.97

151
10
23
4
1104

13.68
0.91
2.08
0.36
100

96.65
97.55
99.64
100

63

Table 3. Age
Age
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Freq.
26
34
37
17
44
35
33
54
40
33
52
37
57
24
45
26
21

Percent
2.36
3.08
3.35
1.54
3.99
3.17
2.99
4.89
3.62
2.99
4.71
3.35
5.16
2.17
4.08
2.36
1.9

Cum.
2.36
5.43
8.79
10.33
14.31
17.48
20.47
25.36
28.99
31.97
36.68
40.04
45.2
47.37
51.45
53.8
55.71

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

42
30
27
25
10
42
25
22
13
12
26
13
13
14
15
18

3.8
2.72
2.45
2.26
0.91
3.8
2.26
1.99
1.18
1.09
2.36
1.18
1.18
1.27
1.36
1.63

59.51
62.23
64.67
66.94
67.84
71.65
73.91
75.91
77.08
78.17
80.53
81.7
82.88
84.15
85.51
87.14

Age
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67+
Don’t
Know
Total

Freq.
7
13
4
6
5
14
6
14
2
15
4
4
7
2
7
1
27

Percent
0.63
1.18
0.36
0.54
0.45
1.27
0.54
1.27
0.18
1.36
0.36
0.36
0.63
0.18
0.63
0.09
2.4

Cum.
87.77
88.95
89.31
89.86
90.31
91.58
92.12
93.39
93.57
94.93
95.29
95.65
96.29
96.47
97.1
97.19
99.59

4
1104

0.31
100

100
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